

Commission Technique 3AF- SIGMA2



**Comments on the preliminary assessment report on UAP
from US ODNI to US Congress**

3AF

La Société Savante
de l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace



SIGMA2 analysis highlights on ODNI report on UAP

Summary¹ :

The UAP report prepared by the Office of the National Intelligence Director (ODNI²) is a threat and security assessment, as directed by the US Congress, in connection with the frequent sighting of UAP in airspace American. It also takes note of the progress of the work of the UAP Task Force and makes recommendations on areas for improvement.

The report draws preliminary conclusions from the analysis of 144 visual, radar, infrared sightings, collected mainly between 2019 and 2021, by the US Navy. It establishes the repeated presence of phenomena or objects in US airspace, near test areas. The preliminary conclusion is the finding of an air presence, constituting a potential threat to aviation safety and security.

This threat is linked to the disturbances impacting the conduct of tests or aerial exercises, including flight safety, but also to the possibility of "intelligence" devices from a foreign power, having advanced technologies, surpassing the american technologies. A certain number of these cases, measured by multiple sensors, show non-standard kinematic characteristics (accelerations, hovering in the wind), and sometimes electromagnetic signals. However, if the classification provides for a class of unknown, non-empty phenomena class, the Extra-Terrestrial Hypothesis (ETH) is not mentioned.

In addition, the report encourages improvements in the reliability of observations by standardized procedures for collecting data between the various services (USAF, US Navy, FAA), but also by suitable sensors and analysis software, including data analytics by artificial intelligence.

This report therefore constitutes a real change in American communication policy on UAP with regard to previous conclusions of 1969. It raises the question of the presence of unknown phenomena and security, tempered by the need to make observations and data more reliable. In contrast, little data is disclosed, if any if one refers to previously published infrared videos. There is therefore no dissemination of scientific information at this stage, nor any declaration of intent on this subject, allowing the study of cases like that of the Nimitz.

¹ Based on the french note on ODNI report analyses issued by SIGMA2 on 30 June 2021

² Office of the Director of National Intelligence



1°) Objective: this report on UAP (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) prepared by the ODNI with the Secretary of Defense, or the American Congress, was submitted on June 25, 2021.

This document marks a break: this is the first recent official assessment by US intelligence of a UAP presence and question to national security, and the progress of the work of the UAP Task Force, led by the US Navy since 2020.

2°) Partial conclusions: while refusing to decide on the nature of the phenomena, and calling for continued and more reliable data collection, this report shows that certain phenomena cannot be explained in the current state of scientific knowledge. It refers to a collection of partially reliable data, on 144 cases of UAP, collected mainly between 2019 and 2021 - by the military of the US Navy.

The main factors limiting reliability are due to:

- the standardized information collection procedures that have only been applied since 2019 for the US Navy and November 2020 for the USAF.
- sensors used which are designed for operational missions and not to collect data on UAPs.
- the geographic concentration of certain latest generation sensors around areas of US strategic interest generating a potential statistical bias (concentration) in data collection³.
- finally, to the human factor, which is also limiting by making the testimonies disparate, in particular by the psychological reluctance of the pilots to testify to the observation of phenomena until then considered as sulphurous.

However, the crossing of multi-sensor and multi-source data, in particular between radars (giving distance and speed) and visible and infrared cameras (giving information on size, shape) could be used in around 90 cases, increasing the reliability of the information extracted⁴.

3) The main conclusions of this report relate to the threat to the safety of military flights and the breach of airspace security.

Following the mandate given to the ODNI, this report makes the preliminary assessment of a repetition of UAP sightings on military test and exercise areas

³ This point nevertheless constitutes the recognition of an apparent abnormal distribution of cases around these areas of testing and exercise.

⁴ Crossing infrared data with radar data (distance) is essential in order to use infrared videos, as SIGMA2 has reminded since early 2018, not being able to interpret US videos, precisely because of the absence of additional data (distance measured by radar , context, ...).



where sophisticated defense technologies are present. These observations, which are sometimes happening at close distance, generate dangerous avoidance maneuvers (11 cases of Airmiss declared) and would call into question the proper conduct of certain tests and naval air maneuvers.

In addition, these overflights are assessed as a risk to the safety of American airspace, whether they are hypothetical “intelligence” planes supposed to observe American tests and training exercise or even disruptive technologies indicating a considerable advance of a foreign power (Russian? Chinese? other?) on American technologies.

4 °) The study of the cases led to their classification into 5 possible causes:

- artificial aeronautical clutter (debris, balloons,) polluting the observations.
- atmospheric natural phenomena (ice clouds, etc.) or thermal layer effects generating parasitic effects (radar, infrared)
- possible national technological devices (government and industrial black programs)
- foreign technological devices spies (Russian, Chinese, or others?)
- other class: which does not correspond to the previous cases with a problem of data reliability.

5°) the main characteristics of the most astonishing cases concern the extraordinary kinematics with stationary flights against the wind during long durations, brutal accelerations, in some cases, EM emissions.

6°) Progress factors are proposed to systematize the observations, make the data more reliable and therefore the conclusions, in particular on the most astonishing cases:

- extension of collection procedures to various government services by including civil aviation data (FAA) both in normal air traffic control procedures and in cases of observed anomalies
- improvement of data collection technologies by applying data analysis techniques (data analytics) by artificial intelligence (machine learning) to identify areas of UAP presence
- the need for a research and technology program to improve the quality and quantity of data and to train the military in collecting information.



Conclusions and remarks of SIGMA2 on the report:

This report is fairly summary. It's interesting because it's the first one. It reports on a radical change in US communication on the subject UAP: it is a subject of safety and national security declared, whereas since 1969, the USAF (Condon) commission of inquiry had concluded that it was absence of risks in US airspace. So this is an answer to our first question⁵: **change of communication policy in the USA on UAP? Yes it is. A change is taking place, mainly on the subject of security.**

It attests to the recovery of numerous data since 2019 (144 cases), part of which could be verified and crosschecked between several types of sensors. Cases demonstrating non-standard kinematic characteristics (speed, acceleration) are validated. **This is therefore a partial answer to our second question: new data and databases are being built. Yes, but...**

These data need to be made more reliable, says the Pentagon. No mention of possible data exchange or scientific cooperation is made at this stage. No new data has been revealed to the public, nor older, for example, in connection with the Nimitz case (radar observation distance or kinematic reconstruction). Research programs on UAPs, AATIP (Advanced Air Threat Identification Program) or AAWSAP (Advanced Aerospace Weapon Systems Applications Program) are not mentioned.

It should be noted in particular that cases showing traces on the ground, effects of disturbing EM radiation, effects of absence of interaction with the ambient environment or of change of environment are not mentioned, with the exception of punctual electromagnetic emissions.

On the ETH question? The subject is not discussed

In conclusion, from SIGMA2 perspective, this report therefore shows a serious consideration of the UAP subject, with the establishment of procedures for collecting data on aerial cases, and a standardization of both the procedures and the subject. **This is a step forward.**

However, this preliminary report, as the title indicates, remains focused on the preliminary assessment of security issues and does not provide any details that would allow scientific assessment of the information already disseminated or to know the research in progress.

There is therefore no additional data since 2018, and this does not yet allow a rigorous and scientific analysis, by study groups like SIGMA2, of the famous infrared videos that have been broadcast. The reconstitutions of the unusual kinematics, however confirmed by the report, are not provided either in support of the assertions on these publicized cases.

At this stage we therefore remain with the same questions concerning the use of those data.

⁵ See the SIGMA2 note on the AATIP program- January 2018 and the Summary of the SIGMA2 2021 Progress Report